Fa-SAT: Fault-aided SAT-based Attack on Compound Logic Locking Techniques
Nimisha Limaye1, Satwik Patnaik2 and Ozgur Sinanoglu3
1Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, USA
nsl278@nyu.edu
2Electrical & Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, USA
satwik.patnaik@tamu.edu
3Division of Engineering, New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE
ozgursin@nyu.edu
ABSTRACT
Logic locking has received significant traction as a one-stop solution to thwart attacks at an untrusted foundry, test facility, and end-user. Compound locking schemes were proposed that integrate a low corruption and a high corruption locking technique to circumvent both tailored SAT-based and structuralanalysis- based attacks. In this paper, we propose Fa-SAT, a generic attack framework that builds on the existing, open-source SAT tool to attack compound locking techniques. We consider the recently proposed bilateral logic encryption (BLE [1]) and Anti- SAT [2] coupled with random logic locking [3] as case studies to showcase the efficacy of our proposed approach. Since the SATbased attack alone cannot break these defenses, we integrate a fault-injection-based process into the SAT attack framework to successfully expose the logic added for locking and obfuscation. Our attack can circumvent these schemes’ security guarantees with a 100% success across multiple trials of designs from diverse benchmark suites (ISCAS-85, MCNC, and ITC-99) synthesized with industry-standard tools for different key-sizes. Finally, we make our attack framework (as a web-interface) and associated benchmarks available to the research community.
Keywords: Logic Locking, Bilateral Logic Encryption, Anti- SAT, Fault-Injection, SAT-based Attacks, Compound Locking.
