DIP Learning on CAS-Lock: Using Distinguishing Input Patterns for Attacking Logic Locking
Akashdeep Saha1,a, Urbi Chatterjee2, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay1,b and Rajat Subhra Chakraborty1,c
1Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, West Bengal, India
aakashdeep@iitkgp.ac.in
bdebdeep@cse.iitkgp.ac.in
crschakraborty@cse.iitkgp.ac.in
2Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, India
urbic@cse.iitk.ac.in
ABSTRACT
The globalization of the integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing industry has lured the adversary to come up with numerous malicious activities in the IC supply chain. Logic locking has risen to prominence as a proactive defense strategy against such threats. CAS-Lock (proposed in CHES’20), is an advanced logic locking technique that harnesses the concept of single-point function in providing SAT-attack resiliency. It is claimed to be powerful and efficient enough in mitigating existing state-of-theart attacks against logic locking techniques. Despite the security robustness of CAS-Lock as claimed by the authors, we expose a serious vulnerability and by exploiting the same we devise a novel attack algorithm against CAS-Lock. The proposed attack can not only reveal the correct key but also the exact AND/OR structure of the implemented CAS-Lock design along with all the key gates utilized in both the blocks of CAS-Lock. It simply relies on the externally observable Distinguishing Input Patterns (DIPs) pertaining to a carefully chosen key simulation of the locked design without the requirement of structural analysis of any kind of the locked netlist. Our attack is successful against various AND/OR cascaded-chain configurations of CAS-Lock and reports 100% success rate in recovering the correct key. It has an attack complexity of O(m), where m denotes the number of DIPs obtained for an incorrect key simulation.
Keywords: Logic Locking, Cas-Lock, Dip-Driven Attack.
