NeuroHammer: Inducing Bit-Flips in Memristive Crossbar Memories
Felix Staudigl1,a, Hazem Al Indari1,b, Daniel Schön3,f, Dominik Sisejkovic1,c, Farhad Merchant1,d, Jan Moritz Joseph1,e, Vikas Rana2, Stephan Menzel3,g and Rainer Leupers1,e
1Institute for Communication Technologies and Embedded Systems, RWTH Aachen University, Germany
astaudigl@ice.rwth-aachen.de
balindari@ice.rwth-aachen.de
csisejkovic@ice.rwth-aachen.de
dmerchantf@ice.rwth-aachen.de
ejoseph@ice.rwth-aachen.de
2Peter Grünberg Institut (PGI-10) Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH, Juelich, Germany
v.rana@fz-juelich.de
3Peter Grünberg Institut (PGI-7) Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH, Juelich, Germany
fschoen@fz-juelich.de
gst.menzel@fz-juelich.de
ABSTRACT
Emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies offer unique advantages in energy efficiency, latency, and features such as computing-in-memory. Consequently, emerging NVM technologies are considered an ideal substrate for computation and storage in future-generation neuromorphic platforms. These technologies need to be evaluated for fundamental reliability and security issues. In this paper, we present NeuroHammer, a security threat in ReRAM crossbars caused by thermal crosstalk between memory cells. We demonstrate that bit-flips can be deliberately induced in ReRAM devices in a crossbar by systematically writing adjacent memory cells. A simulation flow is developed to evaluate NeuroHammer and the impact of physical parameters on the effectiveness of the attack. Finally, we discuss the security implications in the context of possible attack scenarios.
Keywords: ReRAM, Memristor, Hardware Security, Thermal Crosstalk, Reliability, Neuromorphic Computing.
