SOLOMON: An Automated Framework for Detecting Fault Attack Vulnerabilities in Hardware
Milind Srivastava1,a, Patanjali SLPSK1,b, Indrani Roy1,c, Chester Rebeiro1,d, Aritra Hazra2 and Swarup Bhunia3
1Indian Institute of Technology Madras
amilind@cse.iitm.ac.in
bslpskp@cse.iitm.ac.in
cindrroy@cse.iitm.ac.in
dchester@cse.iitm.ac.in
2Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur
aritrah@cse.iitkgp.ac.in
3University of Florida
swarup@ece.ufl.edu
ABSTRACT
Fault attacks are potent physical attacks on cryptodevices. A single fault injected during encryption can reveal the cipher’s secret key. In a hardware realization of an encryption algorithm, only a tiny fraction of the gates is exploitable by such an attack. Finding these vulnerable gates has been a manual and tedious task requiring considerable expertise. In this paper, we propose SOLOMON, the first automatic fault attack vulnerability detection framework for hardware designs. Given a cipher implementation, either at RTL or gate-level, SOLOMON uses formal methods to map vulnerable regions in the cipher algorithm to specific locations in the hardware thus enabling targeted countermeasures to be deployed with much lesser overheads. We demonstrate the efficacy of the SOLOMON framework using three ciphers: AES, CLEFIA, and Simon
Keywords: Fault Attack, Fault Evaluation Tools, Formal Verification
