GhostBusters: Mitigating Spectre Attacks on a DBT-Based Processor
Simon Rokicki
Univ Rennes, INRIA, CNRS, IRISA
ABSTRACT
Unveiled early 2018, the Spectre vulnerability affects most of the modern high-performance processors. Spectre variants exploit the speculative execution mechanisms and a cache side-channel attack to leak secret data. As of today, the main countermeasures consist of turning off the speculation, which drastically reduces the processor performance. In this work, we focus on a different kind of micro-architecture: the DBT based processors, such as Transmeta Crusoe [1], NVidia Denver [2], or Hybrid-DBT [3]. Instead of using complex outof- order (OoO) mechanisms, those cores combines a software Dynamic Binary Translation mechanism (DBT) and a parallel in-order architecture, typically a VLIW core. The DBT is in charge of translating and optimizing the binaries before their execution. Studies show that DBT based processors can reach the performance level of OoO cores for regular enough applications. In this paper, we demonstrate that, even if those processors do not use OoO execution, they are still vulnerable to Spectre variants, because of the DBT optimizations. However, we also demonstrate that those systems can easily be patched, as the DBT is done in software and has fine-grained control over the optimization process.
