Task Scheduling for Reliable Cache Architectures of Multiprocessor Systems

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Abstract

This paper presents a task scheduling method for reliable cache architectures (RCAs) of multiprocessor systems. The RCAs dynamically switch their operation modes for reducing the usage of vulnerable SRAMs under real-time constraints. A mixed integer programming model has been built for minimizing vulnerability under real-time constraints. Experimental results have shown that our task scheduling method achieved 47.7-99.9% less vulnerability than a conventional approach.

1 Introduction

A single event upset (SEU) on a memory module often causes a soft error of a computer system. Occurrence of SEUs in SRAM memories is becoming a critical issue as technology continues to shrink [4–6]. Embedding vulnerable SRAM modules into a system-on-a-chip (SOC) deteriorates reliability of the SOC. From a viewpoint of IC design, accurate reliability estimation and design for reliability (DFR) are becoming important in order that one applies reasonable DFR to vulnerable part of an IC.

Several system vulnerability estimation techniques have been proposed [7–10]. A methodology and an algorithm have been proposed for estimating reliability of computer systems at the instruction set simulation (ISS) level [10]. The estimation methodology adopts cycle-accurate simulation to identify which part of a memory is utilized spatially and temporally during executing programs. Identification of spatial and temporal usage of memory modules contributes to accurate estimation of reliability of computer systems. Since the abstraction level of ISS is higher than that of circuit simulation, ISS-based vulnerability estimation is faster than circuit simulation-based vulnerability estimation. ISS-based vulnerability estimation is appropriate to identifying vulnerability parts of an IC product with short development time.

Design for reliability (DFR) is also one of the themes of urgent concern. Coding and parity techniques are popular design techniques for detecting or correcting SEUs in memory modules. These techniques have been well studied and developed. Recently, Elakkumanan *et al.* have proposed a DFR technique for logic circuits, which exploits time redundancy by using scan flip-flops [1]. Their approach updates a pair of flip-flops at different moments for an output signal to duplicate for reliability purpose. Recently, we have proposed reliable cache architectures (RCAs), in which the structural redundancy of set associative cache memories is exploited for controlling reliability and performance of computer systems [11, 12]. The RCAs dynamically change their operation modes from reliability to performance modes or vice versa, for controlling reliability and

performance of computer systems. Under the performance mode, cache ways operate same as ordinary set associative cache memories. On the contrary, under the reliability mode, cache memories, which are made of vulnerable SRAM cells, are made reliable by the following approaches: (i) Disable cache ways partly or wholly. (ii) Make two or more original cache ways constitute a single reliable cache way. The former approach disables vulnerable part of memories and eliminates their vulnerability from the total vulnerability of the computer system with some performance degradation. The latter approach decreases vulnerability of a cache way by making it multiplicate. Two or more original cache ways hold the same contents and behave as if they constitute a single reliable cache way. Occurrence of an SEU on an original cache way is detected by comparing the values of duplicated original cache ways. Three or more original cache ways can take majority among them and correct an SEU. Under the reliability mode of the RCA, the virtual size of a cache memory decreases while reliability of the cache memory increases.

The RCAs are capable of changing their operation modes from reliability to performance modes or vice versa. The operation mode of the RCAs must be optimally determined for both high reliability and high performance of computer systems. This paper proposes a task scheduling method which optimally determines time series of operation modes of a computer system so that its reliability is maximized under a real-time constraint. We build a mixed integer programming (MIP) model for the task scheduling problem. The target system of the task scheduling problem is a computer system in which multiple processors run on a non-preemptive real-time operating system (RTOS).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews a tradeoff between performance and reliability of a computer system. Section 3 reviews reliable cache architectures. Section 4 presents a mathematical model to schedule tasks for reliable cache architectures of multiprocessor systems. Section 5 presents experimental results on our task scheduling method. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.

2 Performance and Reliability

A soft error rate (SER) is often utilized for measuring and evaluating vulnerability of a memory component. An SER is defined as the number of soft errors which occur during a certain time. All SEUs are regarded as critical to the memory component on measuring its SER. The SER is, however, directly inapplicable to estimating vulnerability of computer systems because computer systems dynamically behave to use memory modules temporally and spatially. Some of SEUs on memory modules make the computer sys-

tems faulty and the others not. In the sense, it is pessimistic to directly adopt the SERs for evaluating reliability of computer systems. From the viewpoint of executing a program, it is not an SER, which is the number of faults during a certain time, but the number of faults during a certain task that should be the metric for estimating reliability of computer systems.

In this section, we briefly review relation between performance and reliability of computer systems. We show the number of soft errors during execution of a program on a microprocessor-based system which consists of an ARM processor (ARMv4T, 200MHz), an instruction cache module, a data cache module, and a main memory module. The cache line size and the number of cache-sets are 32-byte and 32, respectively. We adopted the least recently used (LRU) policy [3] as the cache replacement policy. We evaluated reliability of the computer system, which adopted the write-through policy [3]. The cell-upset rates (CUR) of both SRAM and DRAM modules are shown in Table 1. We used the CURs shown by Slayman [13] as the ones of plain SRAMs and DRAMs and assumed that adopting an error correcting code (ECC) circuit makes the reliability of a memory module 1k times higher.

Table 1. Cell-upset rates.

	Cell upset rates					
	[FIT/bit]		[errors/word/cycle]			
	non-ECC	ECC	non-ECC	ECC		
SRAM	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-7}	4.4×10^{-24}	$4.4 \times 10^{-27} $ 4.4×10^{-31}		
DRAM	1.0×10^{-8}	1.0×10^{-11}	4.4×10^{-28}	4.4×10^{-31}		

Figure 1 shows vulnerability and runtime of a computer system versus the number of cache ways. In the figure, acronyms IL1, IMM, DL1, and DMM indicate an instruction L1 cache, a data L1 cache, a data main memory, and an instruction main memory respectively. Note that the size of a cache way is 1 kB and the cache size is linear to the number of cache ways. This figure shows that increasing the cache size of the computer system decreases its runtime and increases its vulnerability. In this computer system, the vulnerability of the cache memory is dominant in the entire vulnerability of the computer system. The vulnerability of the main memory is too small to see in the figure. The figure explicitly shows that there exists a tradeoff between




Figure 1. Vulnerability vs cache size (ECC L1, ECC main memory).

vulnerability and runtime of a computer system. In other words, it shows that cache memory sizing contributes to adjusting vulnerability and runtime of the computer system. In this paper, we discuss dynamically changing the cache size for reliability and performance of computer system in which SRAMs are more vulnerable than DRAMs.

3 Reliable Cache Architectures

As we discussed in the previous section, decreasing the size of a cache memory contributes to increasing reliability of a computer system, in which the CUR of a cache memory is much higher than that of a main memory, with some performance degradation. In this section, we review reliable cache architectures (RCAs) which dynamically change the cache size, control the vulnerability, and affirmatively accept some performance degradation for increasing the reliability [11,12]. The reliable cache architectures are useful especially for real-time systems in which the deadline times of tasks are given.

There are basically three approaches for increasing reliability of cache memories.

Naive RCA

In this cache architecture, not all cache ways are necessarily utilized for operations. All or some cache ways are deactivated under a reliability mode for increasing reliability of a computer system while all cache ways are activated under a performance mode as shown in Figure 2. Ideally speaking, every cache way should be capable of changing into reliability and performance modes. From the viewpoint of hardware implementation, some of cache ways may change its operation mode.




Figure 2. Naive RCA for N-way set associative cache.

Detection-Oriented RCA

This cache architecture is error-detection-oriented. In this cache architecture, two cache ways are regarded as a redundant pair to constitute a single reliable cache way. The original cache ways are to hold the same content as each other as shown in Figure 3. If an SEU occurs on one of the original cache ways of the redundant pair, the SEU is promptly detected by comparing the contents of the original cache ways before the CPU manages the SEU.




Figure 3. Detection-oriented RCA for N-way set associative cache.

Correction-Oriented RCA

This cache architecture is error-correction-oriented. In this cache architecture, three or more cache ways are regarded as a redundant set and they retain same content as one another as shown in Figure 4. If an SEU occurs on one of the original cache ways, the SEU is promptly detected and corrected by majority rule. A correct value is made by majority among the corresponding cache ways.




Figure 4. Correction-oriented RCA for N-way set associative cache.

The merits and demerits of the three RCAs are summarized in Table 2. Computer system designers should choose one from the three RCAs according as their products require.

Table 2. Three cache architectures.

	Reliability	Area overhead	
Naive	low	low	
Detection-oriented	middle	middle	
Correction-oriented	high	high	

F	Performance	Power	Detection	Correction	Cache size
	high	low	no	no	≤ 100%
	middle	high	yes	no	≤ 50%
	low	high	yes	yes	≤ 33.3%

4 Task Scheduling for Reliable Cache Architectures of Multiprocessor Systems

In this section, we discuss reliability maximization by task scheduling for a non-preemptive real-time operating system (RTOS) which runs on a multiprocessor system. We build a mixed integer programming (MIP) model to solve a task scheduling problem for a computer system in which an RCA is utilized.

Before we build an MIP model, we review an MIP model. An MIP model is generally described as follows [14]:

Minimize: Ax + By

subject to: $Cx + Dy \le E$, such that $x \ge 0$, $y \ge 0$,

where **A** and **B** are cost vectors, **C** and **D** are constraint matrices, **E** is a column vector of constants, \mathbf{x} is a vector of integer variables, and \mathbf{y} is a vector of real variables. Efficient MIP solvers are readily available [15].

We now address a task scheduling problem for a nonpreemptive RTOS on a multiprocessor system, on which $N_{\rm T}$ tasks are executed. Preemption causes large deviations between the worst-case execution times (WCET) of tasks that can be statically guaranteed and average-case behavior. Non-preemptivity gives a better predictability on runtime since the worst-case is closer to the average case behavior. Task i, $1 \le i \le N_T$, becomes available to start at its arrival time a_i and must finish by its deadline time d_i . The RCAs, shown in Section 3, select their operation mode from "the reliability mode" or "the performance mode." Switching the operation modes contributes to controlling both vulnerability and runtime of a task. We define a cache configuration as time series of switching the operation modes for finishing a certain task. Suppose we have M_i alternative cache configurations for Task i. Each cache configuration for a task is different from one another with regard to the time at which the operation modes are switched. The time at which the operation modes are switched is determined by choosing a cache configuration for the task. Figure 5 shows vulnerability and performance of a computer system on various cache configurations for executing a task. In every cache configuration of the task, the task starts with the reliability mode and then the operation mode is turned into the performance mode before it finishes. In the figure, the horizontal axis is the time at which the operation mode is turned from the




Figure 5. Vulnerability and performance by switching reliability to performance mode.

reliability mode into the performance one. This figure obviously shows that there is a tradeoff between reliability and performance for executing a task. We denote vulnerability of Cache Configuration j for Task i by $v_{i,j}$. Similarly, we denote runtime of Cache Configuration j for Task i by $l_{i,j}$. Let s_i be a variable for the start time of Task i.

The task scheduling problem that we address in this section is to minimize system vulnerability by optimally determining the start times s_1, s_2, \dots, s_{N_T} and the cache configuration of every task. The problem is formally stated as

 \bullet \mathcal{P} : Given a multiprocessor system, which consists of $N_{\rm P}$ processors, $N_{\rm T}$ tasks, their arrival and deadline times of Task i, a_i and d_i , M_i cache configurations for Task i, and vulnerability $v_{i,k}$ and runtime $l_{i,k}$ of the kth cache configuration of Task i, assign every task to a processor, select a cache configuration for each task, and determine the start time for each task such that (1) all tasks are executable, (2) every task completes by its deadline, and (3) the overall system vulnerability is minimized.

We now develop an MIP model for Problem \mathcal{P} . We first formulate a nonlinear model, and then linearize it using standard techniques of linearization [14].

Let $x_{i,j}$, $1 \le i \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$, be a binary variable defined as follows:

$$x_{i,j} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if Task } i \text{ is assigned to Processor } j, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

A task is assigned to a single processor. The following constraint, therefore, is introduced.

$$\sum_{i} x_{i,j} = 1, 1 \le i \le N_{\mathrm{T}}.$$

Let $y_{i,k}$, $1 \le i \le N_T$, $1 \le k \le M_i$, be a binary variable defined as follows:

 $y_{i,k} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if Cache Configuration } k \text{ is adopted for Task } i, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

Vulnerability of a computer system is the sum of vulnerabilities of all tasks. Vulnerability of a task is determined by the cache configuration which is adopted. Vulnerability of the computer system, therefore, is stated as follows.

$$V = \sum_{i,k} v_{i,k} y_{i,k}.$$

A single cache configuration is chosen for each task and therefore the following constraint is introduced.

$$\sum_{i} y_{i,k} = 1, 1 \le i \le N_{\mathrm{T}}.$$

Task i starts between its arrival time a_i and its deadline time d_i . The start time s_i is, therefore, bounded as follows.

$$a_i \leq s_i \leq d_i, 1 \leq i \leq N_T$$
.

Task i must finish by its deadline time d_i . A constraint on the deadline time of a task is introduced as follows.

$$s_i + \sum_k l_{i,k} y_{i,k} \le d_i, 1 \le i \le N_{\mathrm{T}}.$$

Now assume that two tasks i1 and i2 are assigned to a processor. Two tasks are simultaneously inexecutable on the single processor. The two tasks must be sequentially executed on the single processor. Two tasks i1 and i2 are inexecutable on the single processor if (i) $s_{i1} < s_{i2} + \sum l_{i2,k}y_{i2,k}$ and $s_{i1} + \sum l_{i1,k}y_{i1,k} > s_{i2}$, or (ii) $s_{i2} < s_{i1} + \sum l_{i1,k}y_{i1,k}$ and $s_{i2} + \sum l_{i2,k}y_{i2,k} > s_{i1}$. The two tasks, inversely, are executable on the processor under the following constraints.

$$\begin{aligned} x_{i1,j} &= x_{i2,j} = 1 \\ &\to \Big\{ \Big(s_{i1} + \sum_{k} l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} \le s_{i2} \Big) \lor \Big(s_{i2} + \sum_{k} l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} \le s_{i1} \Big) \Big\}, \\ &1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\mathrm{T}}, 1 \le j \le N_{\mathrm{P}}. \end{aligned}$$

The task scheduling problem is now stated as follows.

Minimize the cost function $V = \sum_{i,k} v_{i,k} y_{i,k}$ subject to

- $\begin{array}{ll} 1. & \sum_{j} x_{i,j} = 1, \, 1 \leq i \leq N_{\mathrm{T}}. \\ 2. & \sum_{k} y_{i,k} = 1, \, 1 \leq i \leq N_{\mathrm{T}}. \end{array}$
- 3. $s_i + \sum_k l_{i,k} y_{i,k} \le d_i$, $1 \le i \le N_T$. 4. $x_{i1,j} = x_{i2,j} = 1 \rightarrow \{(s_{i1} + \sum_k l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} \le s_{i2}) \lor (s_{i2} + \sum_k l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} \le s_{i1})\}$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.

- $x_{i,j}$ is a binary variable, $1 \le i \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.
- $y_{i,k}$ is a binary variable, $1 \le i \le N_T$, $1 \le k \le M_i$.
- s_i is a real variable, $1 \le i \le N_T$.

Bounds

• $a_i \le s_i \le d_i, 1 \le i \le N_T$.

The above constraint 4) is nonlinear and must be linearized for solving the problem as an MIP model. $A \rightarrow$ $B \vee C$ is the same as $(A \rightarrow B) \vee (A \rightarrow C)$ and therefore the constraint 4) can be written as follows.

$$\left\{ \left(x_{i1,j} = x_{i2,j} = 1 \right) \to \left(s_{i1} + \sum_{k} l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} \le s_{i2} \right) \right\}$$

$$\vee \left\{ \left(x_{i1,j} = x_{i2,j} = 1 \right) \to \left(s_{i2} + \sum_{k} l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} \le s_{i1} \right) \right\}$$

The above constraint is a disjunction of two subconstraints and is nonlinear. The subconstraints themselves are also nonlinear. We first linearize the subconstraints then the disjunction of the two subconstraints. The subconstraints are linearized as follows.

Linearizing $(x_{i1,j} = x_{i2,j} = 1) \rightarrow (s_{i1} + \sum_{k} l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} \le s_{i2})$

- $s_{i1} + \sum_{k} l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} s_{i2} M_{i1,i2} (1 z_{i1,i2,j}) \le 0, 1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\mathrm{T}}, 1 \le j \le N_{\mathrm{P}}.$
- $\begin{array}{l} \bullet \quad M_{i1,i2} = d_{i1} + \max_k l_{i1,k} a_{i2}, \ 1 \leq i1 < i2 \leq N_{\mathrm{T}}. \\ \bullet \quad z_{i1,i2,j} = x_{i1,j} \cdot x_{i2,j}, \ 1 \leq i1 < i2 \leq N_{\mathrm{T}}, \ 1 \leq j \leq N_{\mathrm{P}}. \end{array}$
- $z_{i1,i2,j} \le x_{i1,j}$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.
- $z_{i1,i2,j} \le x_{i2,j}$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.

- $z_{i1,i2,j} \ge x_{i1,j} + x_{i2,j} 1$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$. Linearizing $(x_{i1,j} = x_{i2,j} = 1) \rightarrow (s_{i2} + \sum_k l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} \le s_{i1})$
 - $s_{i2} + \sum_{k} l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} s_{i1} M_{i2,i1} (1 z_{i1,i2,j}) \le 0, 1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$ $1 \leq j \leq N_{\rm P}$.
 - $M_{i2,i1} = d_{i2} + \max_k l_{i2,k} a_{i1}, 1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T.$

The disjunction of the two subconstraints are linearized as follows.

Linearizing
$$\left\{ s_{i1} + \sum_{k} l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} - s_{i2} - M_{i1,i2} (1 - z_{i1,i2,j}) \le 0 \right\}$$

 $\vee \left\{ s_{i2} + \sum_{k} l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} - s_{i1} - M_{i2,i1} (1 - z_{i1,i2,j}) \le 0 \right\}$

- $s_{i1} + \sum_{k} l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} s_{i2} M_{i1,i2} (1 z_{i1,i2,j}) M_{i1,i2} (1 \delta_{i1,i2,j,1}) \le 0$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\rm T}, 1 \le j \le N_{\rm P}.$
- $s_{i2} + \sum_{k} l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} s_{i1} M_{i2,i1} (1 z_{i1,i2,j}) M_{i2,i1} (1 \delta_{i1,i2,j2}) \le 0$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\rm T}, 1 \le j \le N_{\rm P}.$
- $\delta_{i1,i2,j,1} + \delta_{i1,i2,j,2} \ge 1$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.

The task scheduling problem is finally stated as follows.

Minimize the cost function $V = \sum_{i,k} v_{i,k} y_{i,k}$ subject to

- 1. $\sum_{j} x_{i,j} = 1, 1 \le i \le N_{\text{T}}.$ 2. $\sum_{k} y_{i,k} = 1, 1 \le i \le N_{\text{T}}.$ 3. $s_i + \sum_{k} l_{i,k} y_{i,k} \le d_i, 1 \le i \le N_{\text{T}}.$
- 4. $s_{i1} + \sum_{k} l_{i1,k} y_{i1,k} s_{i2} M_{i1,i2} (2 z_{i1,i2,j} \delta_{i1,i2,j,1}) \le 0,$ $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\rm T}, 1 \le j \le N_{\rm P}.$
- 5. $s_{i2} + \sum_{k} l_{i2,k} y_{i2,k} s_{i1} M_{i2,i1} (2 z_{i1,i2,j} \delta_{i1,i2,j,2}) \le 0,$ $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\rm T}, 1 \le j \le N_{\rm P}.$
- 6. $\delta_{i1,i2,j,1} + \delta_{i1,i2,j,2} \ge 1, 1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\rm T}, 1 \le j \le N_{\rm P}, 1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_{\rm T}, 1 \le j \le N_{\rm P}.$
- 7. $z_{i1,i2,j} \le x_{i1,j}$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.
- 8. $z_{i1,i2,j} \le x_{i2,j}$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.
- 9. $z_{i1,i2,j} \ge x_{i1,j} + x_{i2,j} 1$, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.

- $x_{i,j}$ is a binary variable, $1 \le i \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.
- $y_{i,k}$ is a binary variable, $1 \le i \le N_T$, $1 \le k \le M_i$.
- $z_{i1,i2,j}$ is a binary variable, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \le j \le N_P$.
- $\delta_{i1,i2,j,1}$ and $\delta_{i1,i2,j,2}$ are binary variables, $1 \le i1 < i2 \le N_T$, $1 \leq j \leq N_{\rm P}$.
- s_i is a real variable, $1 \le i \le N_T$.

Bounds

• $a_i \le s_i \le d_i, 1 \le i \le N_T$.

Solving the above MIP model yields the optimal schedule which achieves the minimal vulnerability under a certain real-time constraint.

Experimental Results

5.1 **Experimental Setup**

In order to observe effect of our task scheduling method which is stated in Section 4, we adopted a computer system, which has two ARM CPU cores (ARMv4T, 200 MHz), for experiment. Each CPU core has a 4 kB fourway set-associative instruction cache, a 4 kB four-way setassociative data cache, and a main memory modules, as shown in Figure 6. We adopted the naive RCA for cache memories, which was presented in Section 3. The performance mode enabled all cache ways while the reliability mode disabled all of them. We assumed that two CPU cores




Figure 6. A target system.

have their own main memory and can independently transfer data from/to their own main memory. The cache line size and the number of cache-sets are 32-byte and 32, respectively. We adopted the LRU policy for cache line replacement. We used the CURs of both SRAM and DRAM modules which are shown in Table 1.

We used nine benchmark programs as shown in Table 3. Three of the benchmark programs are Compress version 4.0, JPEG encoder version 6b, and MPEG2 encoder version 1.2. We also used basicmath, bitcnts, qsort, susan1, susan2, and susan3, which are supplied from MiBench, an embedded benchmark suite [2]. Varying the time at which the operation mode turns from the reliability mode into the performance one, we made up several cache configurations for every task. The numbers of cache configurations are shown in Table 3. Minimal and maximal runtimes, and minimal and maximal vulnerabilities for each task among its cache configurations are also shown in Table 3.

We used the GNU C compiler and debugger to generate address traces. All programs were compiled with "-O3" option. We assumed that the operation mode of a CPU core may change only once from reliability mode to performance one during execution of each task.

We used an ILOG CPLEX 9.1 optimization engine [15] to solve the MIP model shown in Section 4 so that vulnerability of the computer system was minimized. We solved all scheduling problem instances on an AMD Opteron 275 processor which runs at 2.2 GHz.

5.2 Experimental Results

Vulnerability of the computer system was minimized under five scenarios. The scenarios are different from one another regarding both arrival and deadline times. The arrival and deadline times for all tasks are shown in Table 3. In Scenario 1, all tasks become available from the beginning and are required to finish as soon as possible. The vulnerability of Scenario 1 is basically equivalent to that of a non-RCA computer system. In Scenario 5, all tasks become available from the beginning and have no real time constraints. The vulnerability of Scenario 5 is basically equivalent to that of a computer system which has no cache memories.

Table 4 shows vulnerability, runtime of the computer system, and computation time under the five scenarios. Note that the vulnerability of Scenario 1 is basically equivalent to that of a non-RCA computer system. The vulnerability of Scenario 1 is the upper bound of vulnerability and the runtime is the lower bound of runtime. Comparing with the vulnerability value of Scenario 1, we have found that our task scheduling method achieved 47.7-99.9% less vulnerability as the deadline constraints made some slack. Runtime of the computer system became 1.6-3.0 times longer. Note that increase of runtime has no disadvantage as far as task scheduling satisfies deadline constraints, that is read-time

It took less than a second to minimize vulnerability under Scenarios 1 and 5 while about two to twenty minutes under Table 3. Benchmark programs.

		Task 1	Task 2	Task 3	Task 4	Task 5	Task 6	Task 7	Task 8	Task 9
Program name		Compress	JPEG	MPEG2	basicmath	bitents	qsort	susan1	susan2	susan3
# Cache configuration	ons	45	43	35	24	19	14	16	18	16
Min runtime [10 ⁶ cycles/task]		335	187	138	898	74	48	23	20	6
Max runtime [10 ⁶ cycles/task]		865	821	679	2,258	346	138	149	32	14
Min vulnerability [10 ⁻²¹ errors/task]		7	18	4	111	9	2	3	1	0
Max vulnerability [10 ⁻²¹ er	Max vulnerability [10 ⁻²¹ errors/task]		36,402	12,579	64,846	7,477	2,769	2,116	1,902	655
	Scenario 1	0/ASAP	0/ASAP	0/ASAP	0/ASAP	0/ASAP	0/ASAP	0/ASAP	0/ASAP	0/ASAP
Arrival and deadline times.	Scenario 2	0/1,500	0/1,500	0/1,500	0/1,500	1,100/1,500	1,300/1,500	1,300/1,500	1,400/1,500	1,400/1,500
a_i and d_i [10 ⁶ cycles]	Scenario 3	0/2,000	0/2,000	0/2,000	0/2,000	1,600/2,000	1,800/2,000	1,800/2,000	1,900/2,000	1,900/2,000
	Scenario 4	0/2,500	0/2,500	0/2,500	0/2,500	2,100/2,500	2,300/2,500	2,300/2,500	2,400/2,500	2,400/2,500
	Scenario 5	0/∞	0/∞	0/∞	0/∞	0/∞	0/∞	0/∞	0/∞	0/∞

Table 4. Experimental results.

	Vulnerability	Runtime	Computation time
	[10 ⁻²¹ errors]	[10 ⁶ cycles]	[s]
Scenario 1	6,855,090.3	966.9	0.0
Scenario 2	3,585,254.8	1500.0	351.9
Scenario 3	1,617,569.3	2000.0	145.3
Scenario 4	138,019.2	2500.0	1168.1
Scenario 5	6,813.8	2875.1	0.0

Scenarios 2, 3 and 4. The reason why the computation time became so short under Scenario 1 was that the cache configuration of the shortest runtime, in which no reliability mode was used, was always chosen as an optimal one for every task. Similarly, the reason why the computation time became so short under Scenario 5 was that the cache configuration of the longest runtime, in which no performance mode was used, was always chosen as an optimal one for every task. In Scenarios 2, 3 and 4, tasks conflicted with the others and the solution space on which the optimization engine sought for an optimal solution became large. However, optimization time less than 20 minutes is practical for statically minimizing vulnerability of a computer system offline. A heuristic task scheduling method should be studied and developed for adaptively minimizing vulnerability online. Variation in runtime of tasks should be taken into account for developing online scheduling.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a task scheduling method for reliable cache memories of non-preemptive multiprocessor systems, in which cache memories are capable of changing their operating modes from reliability to performance modes or vice versa, for controlling vulnerability and runtime of the computer systems. We have built an MIP model for minimizing vulnerability of a multiprocessor system under real-time constraints. We have presented several experiments, in which our task scheduling has achieved 47.7-99.9% less vulnerability than a naive task scheduling method for a non-RCA computer system.

Our task scheduling method presented in this paper has been mainly built for statically minimizing vulnerability of non-preemptive multiprocessor systems offline. Our task scheduling method is effective especially for minimizing vulnerability of a computer system statically before its operation. Runtime of a task varies depending on its input data and probably becomes shorter than its WCET. Shorter execution time of the task makes slack for the other tasks to run under the reliability mode. An adaptive task scheduling method should be examined for exploiting slack for more

reliable operation.

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