Date: Wednesday 26 March 2014
Time: 17:00 - 18:30
Location / Room: Konferenz 1
Chair:
Francesco Regazzoni, Alari, CH
Co-Chair:
Shivam Bhasin, Telecom Paristech, FR
Physical Attacks are a major security threat for embedded system applications. This session focuses on several aspects of this problem. The presented papers range from countermeasures against power analysis and fault-based attacks, including electromagnetic and laser injections.
| Time | Label | Presentation Title Authors |
|---|---|---|
| 17:00 | 8.3.1 | EFFICIENCY OF A GLITCH DETECTOR AGAINST ELECTROMAGNETIC FAULT INJECTION Speakers: Loic Zussa1, Amine Dehbaoui1, Karim Tobich2, Jean-Max Dutertre1, Philippe Maurine2, Ludovic Guillaume-Sage2, Jessy Clediere3 and Assia Tria3 1ENSM-SE, FR; 2LIRMM, FR; 3CEA, FR Abstract The use of electromagnetic glitches has recently emerged as an effective fault injection technique for the purpose of conducting physical attacks against integrated circuits. First research works have shown that electromagnetic faults are induced by timing constraint violations and that they are also located in the vicinity of the injection probe. This paper reports the study of the efficiency of a glitch detector against EM injection. This detector was originally designed to detect any attempt of inducing timing violations by means of clock or power glitches. Because electromagnetic disturbances are more local than global, the use of a single detector proved to be inefficient. Our subsequent investigation of the use of several detectors to obtain a full fault detection coverage is reported, it also provides further insights into the properties of electromagnetic injection and into the key role played by the injection probe. |
| 17:30 | 8.3.2 | ANALYZING AND ELIMINATING THE CAUSES OF FAULT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS Speakers: Nahid Farhady Ghalaty, Aydin Aysu and Patrick Schaumont, Virginia Tech, US Abstract Fault Sensitivity Analysis (FSA) is a new type of side-channel attack that exploits the relation between the sensitive data and the faulty behavior of a circuit, the so-called fault sensitivity. This paper analyzes the behavior of different implementations of AES S-box architectures against FSA, and proposes a systematic countermeasure against this attack. This paper has two contributions. First, we study the behavior and structure of several S-box implementations, to understand the causes behind the fault sensitivity. We identify two factors: the timing of fault sensitive paths, and the number of logic levels of fault sensitive gates within the netlist. Next, we propose a systematic countermeasure against FSA. The countermeasure masks the effect of these factors by intelligent insertion of delay elements. We evaluate our methodology by means of an FPGA prototype with built-in timing-measurement. We show that FSA can be thwarted at low hardware overhead. Compared to earlier work, our method operates at the logic-level, is systematic, and can be easily generalized to bigger circuits. |
| 18:00 | 8.3.3 | A SMALLER AND FASTER VARIANT OF RSM Speakers: Noritaka Yamashita, Kazuhiko Minematsu, Toshihiko Okamura and Yukiyasu Tsunoo, NEC, JP Abstract Masking is one of the major countermeasures against side-channel attacks to cryptographic modules. Nassar et al. recently proposed a highly efficient masking method, called Rotating S-boxes Masking (RSM), which can be applied to a block cipher based on Substitution-Permutation Network. It arranges multiple masked S-boxes in parallel, which are rotated in each round. This rotation requires remasking process for each round to adjust current masks to those of the S-boxes. In this paper, we propose a method for reducing the complexity of RSM further by omitting the remasking process when the linear diffusion layer of the encryption algorithm has a certain algebraic property. Our method can be applied to AES with a reduced complexity from RSM, while keeping the equivalent security level. |
| 18:30 | IP4-1, 140 | A MULTIPLE FAULT INJECTION METHODOLOGY BASED ON CONE PARTITIONING TOWARDS RTL MODELING OF LASER ATTACKS Speakers: Athanasios Papadimitriou1, David Hely1, Vincent Beroulle1, Paolo Maistri2 and Regis Leveugle3 1LCIS Laboratory - Grenoble INP, FR; 2TIMA Laboratory / CNRS, FR; 3TIMA Laboratory / Grenoble INP, FR Abstract Laser attacks, especially on circuits manufactured with recent deep submicron semiconductor technologies, pose a threat to secure integrated circuits due to the multiplicity of errors induced by a single attack. An efficient way to neutralize such effects is the design of appropriate countermeasures, according to the circuit implementation and characteristics. Therefore tools which allow the early evaluation of security implementations are necessary. Our efforts involve the development of an RTL fault injection approach more representative of laser attacks than random multi-bit fault injections and the utilization and evolution of state of the art emulation techniques to reduce the duration of the fault injection campaigns. This will ultimately lead to the design and validation of new countermeasures against laser attacks, on ASICs implementing cryptographic algorithms. |
| 18:30 | End of session | |
| 19:30 | DATE Party in "Gläserne Manufaktur" of the Volkswagen AG The DATE Party is again scheduled on the second conference day, Wednesday, March 26, 2014, starting from 19:30 h. This year, it will take place in one of Dresden's most exciting and modern buildings, the "Gläserne Manufaktur" of the car manufacturer Volkswagen AG (www.glaesernemanufaktur.de/en/). The party will feature a flying buffet style dinner with various catering points and accompanying drinks. Light background music and the possibility of guided visits through the extraordinary premises will round off the evening. It provides a perfect opportunity to meet friends and colleagues in a relaxed atmosphere while enjoying local amenities. Please kindly note that it is no seated dinner. All delegates, exhibitors and their guests are encouraged to attend the party. Please be aware that entrance is only possible with a party ticket. Each full conference registration includes a ticket for the DATE Party. Additional tickets can be purchased on-site at the registration desk (subject to availability of tickets). Ticket price for the full Evening Social Programme: 75 € per person. |